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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KIM CHALMER DAVIS, ] 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TERRIE LEE DAVIS, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. 
i Case No. 880452-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court. Jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in 
the Utah Court of Appeals by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2(a)-3 (2) (h) and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
II. NATURE AND PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from those portions of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce entered by the 
Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth District Court Judge, which address 
the issue of alimony. Judge Eves had ordered alimony in an amount 
less than that recommended by the Court Commissioner after reviewing 
the transcript of proceedings held before Court Commissioner Howard 
H. Maetani pursuant to Fifth District Local Administrative Rule 10. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Where the trial of an action for divorce has been submitted 
to a Court Commissioner sitting by Local Administrative Order and 
not by consent of the parties and the Commissioner hears evidence 
and makes a recommendation concerning Findings of Fact, is the 
District Court Judge to whom an objection to the Commissioner's 
Order is taken bound to follow that recommendation unless clearly 
erroneous or may the District Court exercise its independent 
judgment in the matter? 
2. Did Appellant waive her right to appeal the scope of the 
District Court's review of this case by failing to object when the 
Court advised the parties in open court of the scope of its review, 
that is, of its intent to make its own findings upon review of the 
record? 
3. Did Fifth District Court Judge J. Philip Eves abuse his 
discretion or misapply the law when he awarded Appellant alimony in 
the amount of $50.00 per month for two years? 
IV. STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated §78-3-16 
Whenever all the parties to any cause pending in a district 
court or their attorneys of record shall enter into a written 
stipulation appointing a judge pro tempore for the trial of the 
cause, and the person appointed shall take and subscribe an oath to 
faithfully try and determine the issues joined between the party or 
parties plaintiff, naming them, and the party or parties defendant, 
naming them, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in which 
such action is pending to attach together said stipulation and oath, 
and to place them on file, and also to record them at length upon 
the minutes of the court; whereupon the person appointed shall be 
vested with the same power and authority and shall be charged with 
the same duties as to the cause in and as to which he is appointed 
as if he were the regularly elected and qualified judge of the 
district court; provided, that parties may, by the terms of their 
stipulation, limit the power of the judge pro tempore to the trial 
and determination of any specified issue or issues, either of law or 
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fact, and in such case the oath of the person appointed shall 
correspond to the terms of the stipulation. (Repealed April 25, 
1988.) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued the Defendant for divorce. The matter was 
referred to Howard H. Maetani, Court Commissioner, pursuant to Local 
Administrative Rule 10. Commissioner Maetani heard the 
evidence and made a recommendation that Defendant be awarded 
rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $200.00 per month for a 
period of four years. Plaintiff filed a timely objection to that 
recommendation. Shortly after the objection was filed the matter 
was called for hearing before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth 
District Court Judge. At that hearing held April 12, 1988, Judge 
Eves advised counsel concerning his intent to make his own findings 
based on the evidence in the record. Neither party objected. The 
District Court then reviewed the record and reduced the alimony 
award to $50.00 a month for two years. A Decree of Divorce was 
entered consistent with that reduction. This appeal followed. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent concurs in the statement of facts submitted by 
Appellant, supplemented as follows: 
Shortly after Respondent filed his objection to the 
Commissioner's recommendation the matter was called before the Fifth 
District Court, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, for hearing. 
At that hearing the Court asked Respondent's counsel to indicate 
whether he was requesting a new trial and the Court proposed an 
alternative, that is, that the Court "review the transcript of what 
the Commissioner did [to] see if [the Court] would do it 
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differently". Later on the Court stated "If the record contains 
sufficient evidence upon which I can make my own findings then I 
would probably do so in this case where the issues are limited". 
(Transcript of April 12, 1988, hearing at 4 through 6) Neither 
party objected to the Court's notice of intent to make its own 
findings. 
Appellant testified that while employed at Leisure Sports, from 
roughly November, 1987, and until Easter, 1988, (Transcript of trial 
at 47) she would earn $5.50 an hour (Transcript of trial at 45) and 
that she expected to earn minimum wage when not working at Leisure 
Sports (Transcript of trial at 64). 
Neither party submitted any specific evidence at trial with 
regard to monthly living expenses. However, both parties had 
submitted Full Disclosure Financial Declarations in conjunction with 
an earlier hearing on the issue of temporary support. The Domestic 
Commissioner made no specific findings with regard to the financial 
needs and conditions of either party except to find that Plaintiff 
has a gross historical monthly income of approximately $1,500.00 to 
$1,700.00 while the Defendant has a gross monthly income of 
approximately $500.00 to $550.00 (R. 82). Upon considering the 
matter, the Trial Court also made no specific finding with regard to 
the ability of the Plaintiff to pay alimony but did find that while 
Defendant claimed monthly household expenses of $1,195.00 in a Full 
Disclosure Financial Declaration previously submitted, she had 
testified on the date of trial that she had been able to maintain 
the household well on $800.00 per month approximately two years ago 
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when Plaintiff was also a member of the household. With that 
$800.00 she was able to pay for the mortgage, the utilities, the 
dental expenses, the medical expenses and food, and she could use 
what was left over for whatever else she needed (Transcript at 
216-217). For a period of time she also paid the phone bill out of 
that money (Transcript at 216). The only testimony offered by 
either party with reference to anticipated household expenses was in 
the form of an acknowledgment by Plaintiff that the Full Disclosure 
Financial Declaration he had filed in July, 1987, accurately 
reflected his expenses as far as he could calculate it (Transcript 
at 155) and Defendant's acknowledgment that the expenses listed in 
her Full Disclosure Financial Declaration "basically" reflected what 
her monthly needs were to maintain herself and the children. 
(Transcript at 215) 
As per the Full Disclosure Financial Declaration submitted by 
the Plaintiff on July 30, 1987, the Plaintiff's monthly expenses, 
excluding the mortgage on the home, were $1,793.92 (R 24). The 
Defendant's anticipated expenses each month as per her earlier filed 
Full Disclosure Financial Statement, excluding the amount of the 
mortgage payment of $284.00, were "basically" $1,195.00 (R. 51, 
215) . 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Commissioner Maetani's Recommendation was a recommendation. 
The matter had been submitted to Commissioner Maetani pursuant to 
Local Administrative Rule and not by consent of the parties. Cases 
that discuss the binding effect of a master's factual findings when 
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the case is referred to the master by consent of the parties 
therefore do not apply. A court commissioner's recommendation 
concerning Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does not remove 
from the District Court the right and the responsibility to exercise 
its own best judgement with regard to resolution of disputed factual 
and legal issues. That is especially so where, as in this case, the 
credibility of the witnesses is not so much in dispute as is the 
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. 
At the time this matter was submitted to the Trial Court for a 
determination of Respondent's objections to the Commissioner's 
Recommendation, the Trial Court indicated its intent to exercise 
its own judgment in reviewing the record and making findings. 
Neither party objected to that statement concerning the intended 
scope of the District Court's review. Appellant should not now be 
permitted to claim that the Trial Court erred when it did precisely 
what it said it would do and neither party had objected at that 
time. 
When all of the factors relevant to the issue of alimony are 
considered, Judge Eves' Findings and Decree are clearly not an abuse 
of discretion nor a misapplication of the law. Commissioner 
Maetani's recommendation specifically addresses and makes factual 
findings concerning the parties' respective incomes. However, the 
Commissioner did not make findings concerning all of the factors 
necessary to a determination of alimony. The Commissioner made no 
finding concerning the needs of the Defendant or the ability of the 
Plaintiff to provide spousal support. The District Court did make 
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additional findings after a review of the record. In light of those 
findings, it is apparent that the District Court's decree should be 
upheld on appeal. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHERE TRIAL IN A DIVORCE CASE IS SUBMITTED TO A COURT 
COMMISSIONER FOR THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO LOCAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE AND NOT BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES, THE 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COURT COMMISSIONER TO THE DISTRICT COURT IS 
ADVISORY ONLY. 
Parties can waive procedural and constitutional rights; parties 
may consent to have someone other than the Court hear and make final 
determinations on issues of fact. Davis vs. Schwartz, 155 U.S. 631, 
39 L. Ed. 289, 15 S. Ct. 237 (1894) is cited by Appellant for the 
proposition that a District Judge is not free to disregard a 
recommendation supported by the evidence. However, Appellant's 
analysis of that case overlooks a critical factor on which the U.S. 
Supreme Court based its analysis. The Court stated: "The Trial 
Court could not, of its motion, or upon the request of one party, 
abdicate its duty to determine by its own judgment the controversy 
presented, and devolve that duty upon any of its officers...[unless] 
the parties select and agree upon a special tribunal for the 
settlement of their controversy..." 155 U.S. at 239. In that case 
the Court concluded that since the reference to the master was by 
consent the findings of the master were entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. In this case, the matter was not submitted to a Court 
Commissioner by consent of the parties. The matter was submitted 
pursuant to Local Administrative Order 10. 
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Administrative Order No. 10 signed by the Honorable J. Philip 
Eves, Fifth District Court Judge, on September 16, 1987, provides: 
Pursuant to Section 30-3-4.1 through Section 
30-3-4.4, all domestic relations matters in Iron and 
Washington Counties, including orders to show case, 
pretrial conferences, petitions for modification of 
divorce decree, scheduling conferences and all other 
applications for relief, excepting ex parte motions, 
shall be referred to the Court Commissioner upon 
filing with the county clerk. 
In all matters referred to the Commissioner, the 
Commissioner shall review all pleadings and conduct 
hearings for the purpose of submitting recommendations to 
the Court. At such hearings, the Court Commissioner may 
require the personal appearance of the parties and their 
counsel, upon notice; may require the filing of financial 
disclosure statements and settlement proposals; may obtain 
child custody evaluations from the Division of Family 
Services or private agencies under Section 55-15b-6(11), 
Utah Code Ann (1953, as Amended) and may receive evidence, 
by direct testimony or proffer. 
The Court Commissioner shall, after hearing any 
motion or other application for relief, recommend entry of 
an Order by the Court and shall make a written 
Recommendation and Order to the • Court as to each matter 
heard. 
The oral recommendation of the Commissioner shall 
constitute the Order of this Court in the subject case 
until either reduced to writing in a Recommendation and 
Order or modified by Order of the District Court. 
The written Recommendation and Order shall contain 
the preceding paragraph, which should be in bold type and 
which should constitute the first paragraph of the 
document. 
Should the parties object to the Recommendation and 
Order, the matter shall be referred to the District Judge 
for further disposition, which shall consist of a review 
of the record relating to the stated objections. 
The Recommendation and Order shall contain the 
following: 
a. The above referred paragraph. 
b. The recommendation of the commissioner. 
c. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce or other appropriate order. 
Any party objecting to the Recommendation and Order 
shall, within ten days of the entry of the Commissioner's 
Recommendation and Order, provide notice to the District 
Court, the Commissioner and opposing counsel that the 
recommended order is not acceptable. Objections to the 
Commissioner's recommendation must be specific regarding 
each matter to which the party objects. If no objection 
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is made within ten days, the party shall be deemed to have 
consented to entry of an order in conformance with the 
Commissioner's Recommendation and Order. In the event a 
Recommendation and Order is objected to, the 
Commissioner's Recommendation and Order shall stand 
pending the final outcome of further disposition by the 
District Judge. 
In all matters wherein the parties do not object to 
the Recommendation and Order, the Recommendation and Order 
shall become the final Order and Decree of the District 
Court automatically, upon the expiration of ten days 
following the signing of the Recommendation and Order by 
the Commissioner. The signatures of the District Judge 
shall not be required. 
Default, contested and uncontested divorces shall 
also be heard by the Commissioner -. unless otherwise 
directed by the Court. (Emphasis added) 
Local Administrative Order No. 10 requires that the Court 
Commissioner hear uncontested divorces unless otherwise directed by 
the Court but does not give the litigants the opportunity for a 
trial by the Court. That rule also provides that review of the 
Commissioner's recommendation would consist of a review of the 
record relating to the stated objections but does not specify the 
standard of review to be applied. 
Other cases cited by the Appellant in support of her argument 
concerning the proposed binding effect of the Commissioner's 
recommendation are founded on the same rationale enunciated in 
Davis. The parties may, by their consent, have someone other than 
the Court hear a case and make findings. In the State of 
In Wiscombe vs. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024 (Ut. App. 1987) the Utah 
Court of Appeals indicates that "Hearings before the domestic 
relations commissioner are based solely on proffers, without formal 
submission of evidence or testimony." That was not the practice in 
the Fifth District. 
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Florida, Rule 1.490 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with the 
appointment of masters provides: 
"(c) Reference, No reference shall be to a master, either 
generalv or special, without the consent of the parties. When a 
reference is made to a master, either party may set the action for 
hearing before him". 30A Florida Statutes Annotated at 350, Florida 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.490(C). 
Each case cited by Appellant from the State of Florida is 
really a restatement of the doctrine set forth in Davis; Once the 
parties have waived their right to have the Court hear the evidence 
by selecting another tribunal they can not, after the fact, object 
to the findings of that mutually agreeable substitute for the Court 
unless those findings are clearly erroneous. One of the very first 
cases in the State of Florida to acknowledge the binding effect of 
the findings of a master was specifically based on the parties 
having consented to that procedure. In Harmon vs. Harmon, 40 So. 
2d. 209 (Florida 1949) the Court stated: 
"Parenthetically, this court has allied itself with those 
courts which place added importance on the reports of masters to 
whom matters are submitted by agreement of the parties, [citations 
omitted] In such situations it has been said by this Court that the 
findings have the weight of the verdict of a jury." 40 So. 2d at 
213. 
The State of Illinois acknowledges the same rule concerning the 
binding affect of the findings of a master appointed by consent of 
the parties. In People ex rel. Reiter vs. Lupe, 89 NE 2d 824 (111. 
1950) the Court concluded that the Defendants would be deprived of 
their fundamental right to the decision of a master who saw the 
witnesses on the stand and heard all their testimony if another 
master were to review the matter on the record alone and substitute 
its judgment for that of the master who heard the evidence. That 
-10-
decision must be reviewed in light of two critical facts: 1) A 
master at chancery in the State of Illinois was a judicial officer 
whose position in the judicial branch of government is acknowledged 
in the Illinois State Constitution. A magistrate is now an 
"Associate Judge" pursuant to Article 6 section 8 of the Illinois 
State Constitution. An Associate Judge has a term of office of four 
years. He is appointed by the Circuit Court Judges in accordance 
with procedures that the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois 
establishes by rule and an Associate Judge hears matters determined 
2 by Supreme Court rule. Due process as per the Illinois State 
Constitution contemplates a hearing by a magistrate or Associate 
Judge. There is no comparable provision in the Utah State 
Constitution. 2) A recent case in the State of Illinois clarifies 
the effect of a magistrate's report to the Court. In Oak Park 
National Bank vs. City of Chicago, (294 N.E. 2d. 42 (111. App. 
1973). A master had been appointed but had died before completing 
his report. The parties had consented to have a successor master 
prepare the report. Appellant disagreed with that master's findings 
and appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the parties were bound 
by their agreement to have the successor prepare the report and went 
on to discuss the significance to be attached to the report. 
"Furthermore, and finally, although the findings of a master, 
approved by the Trial Court are entitled to due weight on review the 
master's report is advisory only. After filing of the report, the 
facts remain open for consideration by the Trial Court and by the 
reviewing court. This Court will make its own determination as to 
111. Const. 1870, Art. VI, Sec. 8. S.H.A, effective January 1, 
1964. 
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whether...'the decree rendered by the Court [was] a proper one under 
the law and the evidence. ..' Without regard to the finding of the 
master upon any particular question of fact". 204 Ne. 2d. at 45. 
In Illinois the findings of the master appear to be advisory only. 
In McDonald vs. Kenney, 140 SW. 999 (Ark. 1911) the Supreme 
Court of the State of Arkansas acknowledged that parties can agree 
to have someone else settle a controversy but "Parties have a right 
to have a court determine by its own judgment the questions of fact 
and of law involved in any controversy". If the parties agree that 
a special tribunal can hear and settle the matter then they will be 
deemed to have waived certain rights with reference to their 
selection of a hearing officer. However, where the parties have 
had no say in the selection of the particular officer to hear the 
case then the matter should be decided by the Court... in this 
instance the Fifth District Court Judge. 
In Utah, the necessity of consent of the parties prior to the 
appointment of someone to hear a case other than a judge was found 
in the Utah Constitution, Article VIII Section 5 until repealed in 
1984. The Constitution does not now suggest a different rule 
except that the specific language providing for the appointment of 
non judges to sit as judges pro tempore by consent of the parties 
has been deleted. However, at the time this matter was heard, 
consent of the parties was critical. 
U.C.A §30-3-15.3(2) requires the written consent of the parties 
before a judge pro tempore, master or referee can hear certain 
matters. 
Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is essentially 
the same as Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One 
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glaring difference is the requirement that, for the appointment of a 
master to hear cases other than those where "some exceptional 
condition requires," the consent of the parties is necessary. URCP 
Rule 53(b). 
At the time this matter was heard, UCA §78-3-16, provided for 
the appointment of a judge pro tempore upon "written stipulation" of 
the parties. 
The rule that the decision of a Court Commissioner in Utah is 
advisory only is especially applicable in this case where the issue 
in dispute is not one that requires the Trial Court to pass upon the 
credibility of witnesses. In this instance neither Plaintiff or 
Defendant offered direct testimony concerning financial need except 
Defendant's testimony concerning the household expenses when 
Plaintiff was also residing in the home. Other testimony concerning 
financial need was offered by way of incorporating prior testimony 
in the form of Full Disclosure Financial Declarations filed with the 
Court in July of 1988. 
In Anderson vs. Dewey, 350 P. 2d. 734 (Idaho 1960) a successor 
judge, upon consideration of a motion for new trial, vacated certain 
of the findings of the trial judge. The Appellant appealed claiming 
deprivation of due process since the successor judge had not heard 
the evidence. That Court stated: 
"However, in a case where the successor judge, in 
resolving the issues raised by a motion for a new trial, 
is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon 
the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues 
upon questions of law, or upon evidence which is not 
materially in conflict, he may exercise the same authority 
as could the judge who tried the case". 350 P.2d. at 737 
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In this instance the testimony offered with regard to 
Defendant's needs was offered by Defendant herself. There was no 
need to resolve disputed evidence submitted by each party. If there 
was a need to resolve any conflict in the testimony it would involve 
resolving the conflict between Defendant's own testimony and her 
prior filed Full Disclosure Financial Statement which "basically" 
stated her monthly expenses. In such an instance it is not 
necessary for the court determining the matter to actually hear the 
party testify. Even if the "live" testimony were entitled to 
greater weight, Judge Eves was entitled to find, as he did, that the 
child support, when added to Defendant's income, met her and the 
children's needs. 
In order for Respondent to have been deprived of his opportunity 
to have a District Court exercise . its independent judgment in 
resolving disputed issues of fact he must have consented to a waiver 
of that right. In this case no such waiver occurred. This matter 
was referred to the Court Commissioner pursuant to Local 
Administrative Rule. The Court Commissioner exercised his 
discretion and heard evidence and made a recommendation. That 
recommendation may assist the trier of fact the District Court 
Judge but it is advisory only. Any other rule would deprive 
Plaintiff of due process of law. 
II. 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENT 
CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF ITS REVIEW OF THE COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF ANY OBJECTION TO THE 
PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN REVIEWING THE RECORD AND 
EXERCISING ITS INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED. 
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At the hearing held April 12, 1988, the Trial Court invited 
counsel to either request a new trial or request that the matter be 
submitted for the Trial Court's review on the transcript of 
proceedings before the Domestic Commissioner. At that time the 
Trial Court made it clear that he intended to exercise his 
independent judgment with reference to the matters in dispute. The 
Trial Court stated: "If the record contains sufficient evidence upon 
which I can make my own findings, then I would probably do so in 
this case where the issues are limited" (Transcript of April 12, 
1988, hearing at 6). Obviously, the Trial Court intended to 
exercise its independent judgment with reference to its review of 
the facts. No objection was made to that procedure at the time. 
Appellant, having failed to object at that time, should not now be 
permitted to raise that objection and question the practice of the 
Trial Court in that regard. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DESCRETION AND DID NOT 
MISAPPLY THE LAW IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT INDICATED. 
At the trial of this matter evidence was presented concerning 
each party's ability to produce income. Despite Appellant's own 
testimony that, during the ski season, she was able to earn $5.50 
per hour, or the equivalent of over $900.00 a month, and that she 
expected to earn minimum wage, approximately $575.00 a month, during 
other times of the year, the Court Commissioner and the District 
Court concluded that she had an historical earning capacity of 
between $500.00 and $550.00 per month. They also found that 
Appellant had an historical earning capacity of approximately 
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$1,500.00 to $1,700,00. The Court Commissioner cited language from 
Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P. 2d. 96 (Ut. 1986), referred to Boyle vs. 
Boyle, , 735 P. 2d. 669 (Utah App. 1987) and indicated that it had 
considered the factors relevant to a determination of alimony, to 
wit: "1) financial conditions and needs of the wife; 2) the ability 
of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and 3) the 
ability of the husband to provide support." Jones vs. Jones, 700 P. 
2d. 1072 (Utah 1985) as cited in Boyle vs. Boyle. The Commissioner 
did not make any factual findings on any issue regarding alimony 
except the parties' income. Because the Commissioner failed to 
make any factual finding with reference to the ability of the 
Respondent to provide support or the financial condition and needs 
of Appellant, the District Court had no alternative but to review 
the record and make findings. 
The District Court, upon reviewing the record, found that the 
Appellant's needs were "met or nearly so" by her ability to earn 
$550.00 per month and the $350.00 child support recommended. 
Appellant had testified that she was able to maintain the needs of 
the household with $800.00 per month when Respondent was also a 
member of the household and that she and had money left over. 
Respondent's absence from the household would obviously reduce the 
amount necessary to pay basic household expenses and therefore allow 
Appellant additional disposable income for other purposes. 
Appellant's needs are met, or nearly so, when her income is combined 
with the child support ordered. The Trial Court's finding with 
regard to Appellant's financial condition and needs are amply 
supported by the evidence and the alimony awarded is consistent with 
those findings. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
This case was not heard by the Court Commissioner by consent of 
the parties but was heard pursuant to Local Administrative Rule. 
Were this Court to rule that the Court Commissioner's findings were 
binding upon the parties, Respondent will have been denied due 
process of law: the right to have the District Court Judge exercise 
its independent judgment with reference to disputed issues of fact. 
However, Appellant has waived her right to object to the practice 
followed by the District Court Judge in this instance by failing to 
object at the time the scope of the Court's intended review was 
explained to counsel for the parties. Finally, the decision of the 
District Court Judge is amply supported by the record. The District 
Court Judge, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, did not abuse his 
discretion nor did he misapply the law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' day of October, 1988. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
By: 
G. Michael Westfall 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to Gary W. Pendleton 150 North 200 
East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, on the day of 
October, 1988. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT* CQURg^m^/^ 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• • • • • • * 
KIM CHALMAR DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRIE LEE DAVIS, 
Defendant, 
Case Number CV 87 1309 
RECOMMENDATION 
* • • • • * * * 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Domestic Relations Commissioner on February 24, 1988, 
at which time the court took the matter under advisement. The 
court having considered testimony and upon being advised in the 
premises now finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Washington County and 
has been a resident of Washington County for at least three 
months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married at Beaver, Utah, on June 23, 1978. 
3. There have been two children born as issue of the 
marriage, namely: Brittany Lee Davis, born May 28, 1979; and Kim 
Clayton Davis, born June 11, 1982 
4. During the course of the marriage defendant 
admitted having been involved in several physical and emotional 
relationships with various paramours causing the plaintiff great 
mental distress and suffering; therefore, plaintiff is awarded a 
divorce from defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty. 
5. The court considers numerous function-related 
factors in determining permanent custody, including but not 
limited to the following as discussed briefly in Pusey v. Pusey, 
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), and set out more fully In Atkinson, 
Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate 
Courts, 18 Fam. L. Q. 1 (Spring 1984): 
a. Primary caretaker: One of the most important 
factors in the child custody determination is who has been the 
primary caretaker of the child. The parent who has been the 
primary caretaker particularly when the child is young, usually 
has a closer relationship with the'child and is more experienced 
in meeting the child1s needs. In addition to indicating parental 
experience and a close relationship with the child, the parent 
who has been the primary caretaker - also has demonstrated a 
commitment in caring for the child which, barring contrary 
evidence is likely to continue. Factors which would be 
considered to determine which parent is a primary caretaker are 
as follows: 
(1) preparing and planning of meals; 
(2) bathing, grooming and dressing; 
(3) purchasing, cleaning and caring of clothes; 
(4) medical care, including nursing and trips 
to physician; 
o 
(5) arranging alternate care, i.e. babysitting, 
day care, etc.; 
(6) putting child to bed at night, attending to 
child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning; 
(7) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners 
and toilet training; 
(8) education, i.e. religious, cultural, etc. 
The court finds that while both parties are capable of caring for 
the child, the weight of the evidence presented leans towards the 
defendant as the primary caretaker of the parties minor children 
throughout the marriage. 
b. Time available to spend with child: A factor 
related to the identity of the primary caretaker is which parent 
has more time available to spend with the child. While the 
primary caretaker factor looks primarily to time spent with the 
"child in the past, the factor--of time available to spend with the 
child looks to the future. The court finds that the weight of 
the evidence presented indicates that plaintiff will have more 
time available to spend with the children than the defendant. 
c. Stability of environment: If the child has had 
a more stable and secure relationship with one parent than the 
other, custody usually would go to the parent offering more 
stability. The custody evaluation conducted by V. Gerald 
Thamert, L.C.S.W., and the psychological evaluation conducted by 
Richard Y. Moody, Ph.D., psychologist, indicate that the children 
of the parties have bonded very significantly with the defendant 
and "being younger minor children, they have a need to continue 
said bonding; therefore, they recommended that the defendant is 
at this time the most fit and proper person to be awarded the 
custody of the minor children of the parties. 
Further, two other considerations related to stability 
are the child's school performance and health care. The evidence 
shows that the health needs of the children have been met and 
there is no evidence to the contrary that the children are not 
performing well academically in school. 
d. Abuse and neglect: Abuse and neglect of a 
child obviously can be a determinative factor in custody cases. 
The abuse can be physical or verbal. Standards regarding abuse 
do not prohibit physical punishment. Parents or guardians may 
use corporal punishment to discipline their children so long as 
the force used is not designed or known to create a substantial 
risk of death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain 
or mental distress or gross degradation. The court finds no 
abuse of the parties children at this time. 
Neglect includes lack of supervision of the child, poor 
appearance of the child, lack of attention to health needs, and 
inadequate provisions of food, clothing or shelter. The court 
finds no serious neglect of the parties children; however, the 
testimony and evidence presented compels the court to advise both 
parties to insure proper supervision of their children when they 
are in their custody. 
A 
e. Alcohol and drug problems: Another obvious 
factor in custody determination is a parent's drinking or drug 
problems. The testimony presented indicates that defendant has 
used marijuana and perhaps controlled substance; however, the 
court is not convinced that the defendant has an alcohol problem. 
f. Mental instability: Mental instability, along 
with alcohol and drug problems appear as factors approximately 
twice as often in initial custody determinations as they do in 
modification cases. Presumably parents who have those problems 
are more likely to have had them for a long time rather than have 
developed them in between the period of initial custody determin-
ation. In many instances, the problems may have contributed to 
the divorce. 
In most cases in -.which a mental health picture 
draws the attention of the court, the problem is severe, with the 
patient in question either having attempted"1-suicide or having 
been hospitalized. Although a parent's current mental health 
problems are highly relevant to a custody determination, a 
parent's past problems in which the parent has recovered or 
current problems which are considered to not affect the children 
are not grounds for denying custody. In consideration of the 
evidence and testimony presented before the court, the court does 
not believe that the defendant is mentally unstable. 
g. Non-marital sexual relationships: Although 
there is a divergence in the manner in which the court's deal 
with not-marital relationships, there are some situations on 
which most court's agree. A parent who has a discreet sexual 
relationship which the child is not aware of would not lose 
custody because of the affair, unless the parent is spending so 
much time away from home that the child is not being properly 
cared for. A parent who has a relationship of which the child 
might be aware, but refrains from engaging in sex when the child 
is home, will also usually not lose custody. A parent who 
terminates an affair is not likely to resume it would not likely 
lose custody because of the affair. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a parent who has 
multiple lovers in a short period of time and whose children are 
aware of the relationship will lose custody—especially if the 
parent shows other signs of instability. In addition, a parent 
who has her lover over when the children are at home and places 
the children in a particularly embarrassing situation is not 
likely to gain custody. 
In between the extremes is a lot of gray area in 
which case turn on the degree to which a court will presume, 
without specific proof that a non-marital sexual relationship is 
harmful to a child. 
Non-marital relationships, like marriages, vary 
considerably in their quality and in their impact on children. 
Some will have a positive impact; others will have a negative 
impact; and some may be a mixture of both. While the specific 
nature of a particular relationship may lead to a justifiable 
presumption that the impact of the child will be negative, a 
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negative presumption should not apply to all non-marital sexual 
relationships. Each case must be examined on its own facts. 
In consideration of the testimony and evidence 
presented, the court does not believe that defendant's extra 
marital actions has created a negative impact upon the parties' 
minor children at this time. 
h. Child's preference: The weight given the 
child's preference will vary with the child's age, intelligence 
and maturity. The court will not put the child in a situation 
where they must choose which parent they will live with, as that 
will create a situation in which influence and manipulation would 
abound. The court finds that pursuant to the custody evaluation 
and psychological evaluation submitted, both children love both 
of their parents and want to maintain a relationship with both 
parents. 
i. Joint custody: The minimum criteria for joint 
custody is as follows: 
(1) Both parties are fit; 
(2) both desire continuous involvement with 
the children; 
(3) both parents are seen by the child as a 
source of security and love; 
(4) both parents will communicate and 
cooperate in promoting the children's best interests. 
Obviously the most important criteria for issuing a 
joint custody order is cooperation of the parents. The court 
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finds that in this case both parents are fit; they both desire 
continuous involvement with their children; that plaintiff and 
defendant are seen by the minor children as a source of security 
and love; however, the court finds that both parents are unable 
to communicate and cooperate at this time in promoting the 
successful joint custody situation. 
j. Split custody; The court is reluctant to split 
children because close family relationships should be encouraged; 
brothers and sisters need each others strengths and associations 
in the every day and often common experiences and to separate 
them unnecessarily is likely to be a traumatic and harmful 
situation. In addition, siblings particularly need each others 
support to deal with the strain of divorce. The court considered 
split custody in this situation; however, the court is looking 
for the best interests of the children and not a solution that 
will satisfy the parties at the expense of the children. Again, 
pursuant to the custodial evaluation and the psychological 
evaluation submitted to the court, the court finds that a split 
custody situation in this matter is without merit. 
Pursuant to the custody evaluation and 
psychological evaluation submitted to the court and in 
consideration of the aforementioned paragraphs above, the court 
finds that defendant on a temporary basis is a fit and proper 
person to be awarded the care, custody and control of the parties 
minor children, and that such award is in the children's best 
interests subject to reasonable visitation rights in the 
defendant and contingencies set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 below. 
A 
b. The mother shall have the children on Mother's 
Day and her birthday, and the father shall have the children on 
Father's Day and his birthday. 
c. Every other state and national holiday. 
d. One-half of the Christmas vacation, i.e. when 
the children's Christmas vacation commences until 1:00 p.m. on 
Christmas Day for the year 1988 and from 1:00 p.m. Christmas Day 
until one day before the children need to return to school in 
1989, and the parties to alternate the division of the Christmas 
vacation each subsequent year thereafter. 
e. Four weeks of summer visitation to be elected 
by the plaintiff between the months of June, July or August for 
1988. Commencing 1989 five weeks summer visitaiton between the 
months of June, July and August. 
f. All visitation periods shall be exercised in a 
prompt manner so that both parties can - make their plans 
accordingly. The noncustodial parent shall pick the children up 
from the front steps of the custodial parent's residence no 
earlier than 15 minutes prior and no later than 15 minutes after 
the visitation period commences. Return of the children to the 
front steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also be 
subject to the 15 minute rule. The custodial parent shall have 
the children fed and ready on time for visitation with sufficient 
clothing packed and ready for the visitation period. 
g. In the event the children are ill and unable 
to visit, a makeup visitation will be allowed to the noncustodial 
parent on the next succeeding weekend. 
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6. It is in the children's best interests to have the 
noncustodial parent involved in their lives including such areas 
as school, sports, church, scouting and other activities in which 
the child has an interest. The custodial parent is responsible 
for advising the noncustodial parent of particular events of 
progress of the child in their custody. 
7. While the parties minor children are in the 
defendant's- temporary custody, defendant is restrained from 
smoking marijuana and/or use of other controlled substances; she 
is further restrained from having any male companions in her home 
overnight. Also, "pursuant to the custody and psychological 
evaluations submitted to the court, the courtwill review the 
custody situation within one year from the date of this 
recommendation and/or as soon as it can be scheduled by either 
party thereafter with the clerk of the court. At the time of the 
review hearing, an updated report from V. Gerald -Thamert and 
Richard Y. Moody is requested. Further, if the court finds it to 
be in the best interest of the children to change custody, it 
will do so without finding a change of circumstances because it 
is only awarding defendant temporary custody at this time. 
8. The noncustodial parent is granted reasonable 
visitation with the children, which shall include, but is not 
limited to the following: 
a. Every other weekend from Friday evening at 
6:00 p.m. to Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
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h. The children will not be permitted to 
determine whether they wish to visit with the noncustodial 
parent. Personal plans of the custodial parent or children, 
school activities, church activities, or other considerations 
will not be reasons for failing to adhere to the visitation 
schedule set forth in the order. Only substantial medical 
reasons will be considered sufficient for postponement of 
visitation*-
i. Both parties will provide addresses and 
contact telephone numbers to the other party and will immediately 
notify the other party of any emergency circumstances or 
substantial changes in the health of the children. 
j. The noncustodial parent shall, in addition to 
the visitation set forth in this order, have the unlimited right 
to correspond with the minor children of the parties and to 
telephone" the minor children during "reasonable hours without 
interference or monitoring by the custodial parent or anyone else 
in any way. Unless otherwise agreed to between the parties, 
telephone conferences between the noncustodial parent and the 
children shall be limited to no more than once per week and shall 
be, in total, 15 to 20 minutes or less in duration. 
k. Both parties are restrained and enjoined from 
making derogatory or disparaging comments about the other party 
or in any other way diminishing the love, respect, and affection 
that the children have for either party. 
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9. The parties have a home located at 98 East 300 
South in Beaver, Utah. During the parties marriage, the 
plaintiff and his father and defendant's father and other family 
members assisted in building the aforementioned residence. The 
home has an apparent fair market value at the present time of 
about $80,500.00- That plaintiff's father provided financial 
assistance in the construction of the home and closing cost in 
the acquisition of the property in an approximate amount of about 
$4,000.00. 
The court awards defendant temporary possession of the 
above described home with defendant to have the exclusive use and 
occupancy thereof for the parties minor children in defendant's 
custody for two years from the date of this recommendation 
pursuant to defendant's request or until such time as defendant 
remarries or cohabitates, or moves from the home. During this 
period of occupancy, defendant is~ responsible for all mortgage 
payments and other costs associated with the upkeep of the home, 
i.e., maintenance, taxes, etc. 
Upon the occurrence of the first of the conditions 
enumerated above, the residence should be sold as soon as 
reasonbly practicable and the proceeds of the sale applied as 
follows: 
(a) First, to pay expenses of sale; 
(b) Second, to retire any and all mortgages and liens, 
including but not limited to the $4,000.00 owing to plaintiff's 
father, and any amount that can be proven paid by plaintiff in 
the acquisition of the lot prior to his marraige to the 
defendant; 
(c) Last, the balance remaining thereafter to be 
divided equally between the parties. 
10. The parties have been separated for approximately 
two years; therefore, the parties have no outstanding marital 
debts or obligations that needs to be considered by the court. 
Thus, each party is responsible for all debts and obligations 
incurred by themselves and to hold the other party harmless from 
any liability. 
11. It is reasonable and proper that the parties be 
required to maintain in effect a policy of dental, health and 
accident insurance at all times if it is available through their 
respective employers at reasonable costs, with the minor children 
of the parties named as beneficiaries thereunder. Further, each 
party should pay one-half of all deductible amounts and -one-half 
of all noncovered medical and dental expenses of said minor 
children. If neither party is able to supply said insurance, 
each party should be responsible for the payment of one-half of 
all reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the 
minor children. 
12. Plaintiff is self-employed as a general 
contractor; however, he is presently between bids and requested 
i 
that the court ordered temporary support of S550.00 be reduced 
and made retroactive to August, 1988, since his petition was 
filed July 29, 1988. But plaintiff has an approximate historical 
13 
monthly gross earnings of $1,500.00 to $1,700.00 per month. 
Plaintiff has a responsibility to support his children; 
therefore, the court may take into consideration his historical 
earnings when he has suffered a temporary decrease in income as 
set out in Olsen v. Olsen, 704, P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). Therefore, 
the court will require plaintiff to pay child support in the 
amount of $175.00 per month per child for the parties minor 
children. Said child support obligation is effective March, 
1988. Further, the court will also deny plaintiff's request for 
reduction of the amount he was ordered to pay on a temporary 
basis. If plaintiff becomes delinquent in his ongoing child 
support obligation in an amount at least equal to child support 
payable for one month, then the defendant is entitled to 
mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-45d-l, et seq. (1953) as amended. 
13. In Paffel v. Paffelf 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court determined the purpose of alimony to be to 
enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and prevent that 
spouse from becoming a public charge. In considering alimony, 
the court must consider: 
(1) the financial condition and needs of the 
receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse toproduce 
a sufficient income for himself or herself; 
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(3) the ability of the paying spouse to provide 
support. See Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987); see 
also Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987). 
Plaintiff has a gross, historical, monthly income of 
approximately $1500-1700 while defendant has a gross monthly 
income of approximately $500.00-550.00. Based upon the above 
mentioned considerations, the court finds that the defendant is 
entitled to $200.00 per month as rehabilitative alimony for four 
years. Defendant is to gain the necessary skills within this 
time period by attending school as suggested in the custody 
evaluation of Mr. Thamert. 
14. During the course of the marriage the parties have 
acquired items of personal property. Said personal property of 
the parties should be distributed as follows: 
(a) To the plaintiff as indicated in defendant's 
exhibit D-15. 
(b) To the defendant as indicated in defendant's 
exhibit D-15. 
15. The parties are mutually restrained from 
harassing, annoying, vexing and/or interfering with the lifestyle 
of the other party. 
16. Each party should be ordered to assume his/her own 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecutng this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that the parties are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court as set out above under the court's 
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Findings of Fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree 
of divorce from the defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, 
the same to become final upon entry therein. 
2. The court concludes that all other issues of 
dispute have been resolved by the court pursuant to the above 
Findings of Fact. 
3. The parties have ten (10) days from the date of 
this recommended decision to file a specific written objection 
with the clerk of the court. If no objection to the foregoing 
recommendation is timely filed, counsel for plaintiff is directed 
to prepare an appropriate order consistent with the foregoing 
rule. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this o?<^ day of March, 1988. 
RECOMMENDED BY: 
cc: G. Michael Westfall 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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father and such additional amount as plaintiff can prove 
invested in the building lot prior to the marriage. Plaintiff's 
objection appears to be that since he worked extra hours, did the 
construction himself and did trade work for the house, he should 
get a lion's share of the equity. Plaintiff testified, however, 
that defendant was a good wife to him during those first five (5) 
years of marriage; she cooked his meals, cleaned his house and 
otherwise performed her function as his wife. I fail to see why, 
in this marital partnership, plaintiff should consider his 
contribution to the house as anything extraordinary since he was 
merely performing his function as a good husband. That is the 
nature of a partnership. Objection No. 1 is overruled and denied 
and that portion of the Commissioner's Recommendation is approved. 
2. Plaintiff next objects .to the commissioner's finding 
on the earnings of the defendant and the award of alimony in the 
amount of $200. per month for four (4) years. A careful review of 
the evidence presented at trial reveals no reason to disturb the 
commissioner's findings regarding the earnings of the defendant. 
Although defendant did testify that she earned $5.50 per hour 
during the "ski season at Mount Holly", she was not at all clear 
as to how long that job lasted. Also, her testimony as to her 
anticipated earnings after the ski season were, at best, 
conjectural since she had no immediate employment prospects. The 
commissioner was well within the bounds of the evidence submitted, 
i n c l u d i n g F"-w,> <- . ^ 
IHUI I, i 11 »j I I K * r . - 'Ucjnr h • i r * :v . c a r a c ; t 
With r eoa*^ , , % ^ r ^ a- *-* "**<-• 'n 
' . ' " ^ •" °uadeu . >_ « .
 :*.,*«.r 
v ^w^r
 ;
 !fK^v:r ^a""1 1, *-" ^ i f ^ e d 
Defendant: r ^ e ^ n * '• Airr"5-*^* - ioe iL "• ' 
pf , I 1 |P - f i i i i ii her r e h a b i l i t a t i v e 1 t r a i n n 
e d u c a t i o n t e n | iny< her }<«h ,1 k i l l s , I n -'ir'ri i 11 <M> , , i 11 h ^  
d e f e n d a n t FMhnnt *•<•»* i f ' O ' >•' • i« m f - I «i- J , , U J I , < J J 
J M ^ I I I M I iiiiniihi houser ioid e x p e n s e s a t | i l l i t , , t. he t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
s h e was a b l e n iirinane t h * h o u s e h o l d VP ' IITI f'^ '^  | i ^ h . 
When defend an? " • •( i i * i u i t«> i i * f n 
i v\ (imnteneieci monr.Mjy c h i l d s u p p o r t , ir i <: i o a r tna t ner needs a r 
met < v n e a r l y sc
 r ' ^ r ^ * - ^ * 
commiF- c . month I_T- V fo r 
fou t o i s a p p r c v e d ind t h . s J : - r d e r c ~c?~, ^u u i d t 
p l a i n t i f f -.*.*«.. ^->-* *- '
 f 
J C i ».: »;;.'. ^ T G ! - v yea 
peri-w -'t-:^- '- 'ar:: house xS SuiJ anu cne 
equity di c* r * ^ ,,f* *•"" whiche 
objects s* „ '^r:1 .t:or r ;ersc -a, 
property alues fixed thereor -v * *+ ^~,, 
commissioner uuviuu d 
valuations set forth in Exhibits D-13 and D-15, which were the 
only items of property discussed during the trial. Although the 
values are in dispute, the differences do not appear substantial 
and I find the division was equitable in consideration of all the 
circumstancesf including the plaintiff's purchase of the Nissan 
300 ZX automobile using money which defendant felt was partially 
marital in nature. (See Trial Transcript, P 212 and 213). 
Plaintiff apparently feels that the commissioner failed 
to award some items of property but I find neither discussion of 
nor reference to those items in. the record. If additional items of 
property remain in dispute, the Court retains jurisdiction and 
will deal with those items upon proper notice. 
It is, therefore, the Court's intention to approve the 
Commissioner's Recommendation and adopt it as the final Order and 
Decree of this Court, except as to the award of alimony, which is 
modified as set forth in Paragraph 2 above. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare appropriate Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this of June, 1988. 
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